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Immigration and the labour market in Portugal

The role of immigrants in Portugal's labour market between 2021 and 2025: sectors with labour shortages, complementarity with Portuguese workers and fiscal impact.

41% of workers in agriculture and fishing are immigrants.

Labour market · 2021–2025 · 22 min read · A study by the maisimigracao community, based on the official data cited at the end.

An Analysis of Myths, Structural Complementarity and Fiscal Impact

In short

The question. Do immigrants take jobs from Portuguese workers, or fill posts that would otherwise stay vacant? The study compares unemployment, sectors with open vacancies and contributions to Social Security, using data from 2021 to 2025.

What the study shows

  • Unemployment and contracts (section 1). In 2022, the unemployment rate was 6.1% nationally and 14.3% among non-EU foreigners. About 33.3% of foreign workers had a temporary contract, against 16% of Portuguese workers.
  • Sectors (section 2). In December 2023, foreigners were 41% of workers in agriculture and fishing, 31% in accommodation and food service, and 23% in construction.
  • Age (section 3). Between 80.5% and 85% of resident foreigners are of working age (15–64).
  • Social Security (section 4). Immigrants’ net balance for the system was +€1,820 million in 2023/2024.

In practice. According to these data, resident foreigners, in particular those from outside the EU, show more unemployment and more fixed-term contracts than the average. Knowing your contract, the trial period and where to turn when rights are not respected helps; this is in the guide to working in Portugal. The NISS and Social Security and IRS guides cover deductions, and My path sets out the route.

Limits. The unemployment and insecurity indicators date from around 2022 and the sector concentration figures from 2023, so they do not refer to the same year.

Section 1: The Replacement Myth: A Comparative Analysis of Unemployment

Any analysis of employment in Portugal over the last four years must first address the public perception that immigrant labour is “replacing” Portuguese workers. This hypothesis, often called the “replacement theory”, holds that immigrants compete directly for the same jobs as nationals, driving up unemployment among the native population. However, a rigorous analysis of official data from the National Statistics Institute (INE) and other statistical databases, such as Pordata, not only fails to support this hypothesis but points to the exact opposite.

1.1. Context of the National Labour Market (2021–2025)

To assess any displacement effect, we must first describe the general state of the Portuguese labour market. INE data for 2024–2025 show a relatively stable labour market with historically low unemployment, close to what many economists would consider technical full employment.

INE’s economic reports show that Portugal’s overall unemployment rate has moved within a narrow band. For example, it stood at 6.7% in the fourth quarter of 2024¹, after 6.1% in the third quarter of 2024.² Throughout 2025, the monthly figures stayed in the same range, at 6.3% in May, 6.0% in June, 5.8% in July and 6.0% in September.⁴ The Bank of Portugal, compiling INE data, confirms this trend of stability.⁵

This picture, with low and stable overall unemployment (between 6.0% and 6.7%), is not consistent with a narrative of mass labour displacement. Under widespread replacement, one would expect significant upward pressure on the national unemployment rate as native workers were systematically passed over. The data do not show this pressure.

1.2. The Counter-Evidence: Unemployment Rates by Nationality

The most direct rebuttal of the replacement myth lies in comparing unemployment rates between nationals and foreigners. If immigrants were “taking the jobs”, one would logically expect their unemployment rate to be lower than that of nationals (showing that they were preferred) and national unemployment to be rising.

The official data show exactly the reverse. A Pordata snapshot released for International Migrants Day concluded unequivocally that the “unemployment rate among immigrants is double the national average”.⁶

More granular 2022 data, cited by Jornal Económico on the basis of Pordata, quantify this gap starkly⁷:

  • Average national unemployment rate (2022): 6.1%
  • Unemployment rate of foreigners (non-EU): 14.3%

This gap of more than 8 percentage points shows that the immigrant population, particularly people from outside the European Union, faces significantly higher barriers to entering and staying in the labour market.

1.3. A Deeper Look: Precarity, Income and Poverty

The vulnerability of the immigrant population is not limited to unemployment. The data show that, even when employed, foreign workers face more precarious conditions and lower pay.

  • Job precarity: In 2022, more than a third of foreign workers (about 33.3%) had a temporary employment contract. This contrasts sharply with Portuguese workers, of whom only 16% were in the same situation. That year, Portugal had the fourth-highest job precarity among foreigners in the EU.⁷

  • Pay gap: In 2021, foreign workers earned on average €94 a month less than the national average.⁷

  • Poverty risk: As a direct consequence, in 2022 one in three foreigners (30.7%) was at risk of poverty or social exclusion, 11 percentage points above the figure for the Portuguese population (19.8%).⁷

The narrative that emerges from these data is therefore the opposite of replacement. The immigrant population is not displacing nationals from stable, well-paid jobs; instead, it is absorbing a disproportionate share of the labour market’s precarity and vulnerability.¹⁰

The high unemployment rate of 14.3% and the marked precarity suggest that, in economic terms, the immigrant population works as a “reserve army” of labour. This group is more exposed to economic fluctuations and holds the least stable positions, which national workers, enjoying an unemployment rate of 6.1%, are better able to turn down.

Table 1: Comparative Analysis of Unemployment and Precarity (c. 2022)

Indicator National Average Foreign Population (Non-EU) Conclusion
Unemployment rate (%) 6.1% 14.3% Immigrants face double the unemployment rate, refuting the idea of “replacement”.
Temporary contract rate (%) 16.0% ≈ 33.3% Job precarity is twice as common among immigrants.
Risk of poverty or social exclusion (%) 19.8% 30.7% Social vulnerability is significantly higher among foreigners.

Sources: Pordata, as reported in ⁷; INE ¹

Section 2: The Complementarity Thesis: Sector Shortages and Unfilled Vacancies

Having refuted the replacement hypothesis, the analysis turns to the alternative narrative: complementarity. This thesis holds that Portuguese nationals are increasingly reluctant to take jobs in specific sectors, marked by low pay, physical hardship or demanding hours, and that immigrant labour fills these vacancies, which would otherwise stay empty, keeping vital sectors of the economy running.

2.1. The Official Diagnosis: Labour Shortages in Portugal

Recent official reports confirm that Portugal faces a structural labour shortage, due not only to a lack of skills but also to the working population’s unwillingness to take certain jobs.

A 2024 report on labour shortages by the Strategy and Studies Office (GEP) of the Ministry of Labour¹² identifies two kinds of shortage in Portugal:

  1. Quantitative shortage: A general lack of labour caused by adverse demographic trends (population ageing) and the emigration of working-age nationals.

  2. Qualitative shortage (mismatches): When labour supply does not match demand, even with unemployment present.

Crucially, the GEP report¹² attributes this qualitative shortage partly to “preference mismatches”. These are defined as the workforce’s reluctance to take vacancies because of negative perceptions of the quality or image of those jobs and, crucially, because of the “working conditions offered (pay, working hours, arduousness of tasks, etc.)”.

This structural shortage shows up in data from the Institute for Employment and Vocational Training (IEFP). Reports from 2021 were already warning of more than 20,000 to 23,000 job vacancies “that nobody wants” piling up at the IEFP, a number that had doubled since 2017.¹³

The sectors with the most accumulated, hard-to-fill vacancies are¹³:

  • Accommodation and food services
  • Construction
  • Real estate and administrative activities (which include cleaning services)

A direct look at the active job offers on the IEFP portal¹⁵ confirms this list, highlighting specific occupations with hundreds of unfilled vacancies:

  • Waiter/waitress (186 vacancies)
  • Kitchen assistant (165 vacancies)
  • Bricklayer (145 vacancies)
  • Cook (144 vacancies)
  • Cleaner in offices, hotels and other premises (117 vacancies)

The president of the IEFP, quoted in an article about these unfilled vacancies, attributed the difficulty to the “intensive work” and “lower wages” inherent in these activities, which lead Portuguese workers to turn them down.¹⁴

2.2. The Market’s Solution: Concentration of Immigrant Labour

The complementarity thesis is confirmed when the data on vacancies “unwanted” by nationals (Section 2.1) are set alongside data on where immigrant labour actually works. The match is almost perfect.

December 2023 data compiled by the Instituto +Liberdade¹⁶ reveal an extraordinary concentration of foreign workers in precisely the sectors where the shortage of national labour is most acute:

  • Agriculture and fishing: 41% of all workers are foreign.
  • Accommodation and food services: 31% of all workers are foreign.
  • Construction: 23% of all workers are foreign.

Other 2023 reports, citing the Bank of Portugal and the Migration Observatory¹⁷, confirm this structural dependence with very similar figures: 42% in agriculture, 31% in construction and 23% in tourism. In some regions the dependence is total: 90% of farm harvest workers are immigrants.¹⁷ In tourism the predominance is clear, with 8 in 10 foreign workers being Brazilian.¹⁷

2.3. The Employers’ Perspective

Employers’ associations in these sectors have been vocal about their inability to recruit national workers, supporting the narrative that these vacancies are filled by immigrants out of necessity.

AHRESP (the Portuguese Hotel, Restaurant and Similar Businesses Association) has consistently reported huge “recruitment difficulties” in its 2023 and 2024 surveys.¹⁸ An October 2024 study²⁰ detailed that, besides “lack of training” (66%), a primary difficulty is the “short supply or lack of people interested” in the available vacancies.

As a direct and inevitable consequence, the same AHRESP study found that 59% of restaurant and hotel businesses in Portugal already employ foreign workers.²⁰

In agriculture (CAP) and construction the position is identical, with the confederations actively calling for more channels for foreign labour to enter, which they describe as essential for their sectors to survive and grow.²¹

Cross-referencing these three data sets (official shortage, unfilled vacancies and immigrant concentration) conclusively confirms Narrative 1. Immigration is not competing with nationals; it is allowing whole sectors of the Portuguese economy to function by filling vacancies that the national workforce, because of low pay, hardship and better alternatives (given low overall unemployment), has left empty.

Table 2: National Labour Shortage vs. Concentration of Immigrant Labour (c. 2023–2024)

Sector Evidence of National Labour Shortage Share of the Workforce That Is Immigrant
Accommodation and food services “Preference mismatch”.¹² Thousands of IEFP vacancies (waiters, cooks).¹³ AHRESP reports a “lack of people interested”.²⁰ 31%
Agriculture and fishing Intensive, low-paid work.¹⁴ Employers actively call for more foreign labour.²¹ 41%–42% (reaching 90% in seasonal harvests¹⁷)
Construction Large number of IEFP vacancies “that nobody wants” (bricklayers).¹³ 23%–31%
Cleaning “Preference mismatch”.¹² Large number of IEFP vacancies (cleaners).¹⁵ (Included in “Administrative activities”: 28%)

Sources: GEP ¹²; IEFP ¹³; AHRESP ²⁰; Instituto +Liberdade ¹⁶; Bank of Portugal ¹⁷

Section 3: The Portuguese Paradox: Skilled Emigration and Essential Immigration

The complementarity described in Section 2 does not happen in a vacuum. It is largely a direct consequence of a second narrative: Portugal’s demographic transformation. The country faces a paradox: while it becomes structurally dependent on immigrant labour for low-skilled sectors, it is at the same time “exporting” its own young, skilled human capital. This “brain drain” creates the demographic and labour vacuum that immigration (with a different profile) helps to fill.

3.1. The Demographic Vacuum: Portugal’s “Brain Drain”

Portugal remains, structurally, a country of emigration. This outflow is not a thing of the past; it is a present-day reality with a deep impact on the working-age population.

  • Outflow: In 2023 an estimated 70,000 Portuguese emigrated, a figure stable on 2022, with Switzerland again the main destination.²³

  • Impact on the young: The cumulative effect of this continuous emigration is alarming. According to the Emigration Observatory, 30% of young people born in Portugal now live abroad.²⁵

This emigration is increasingly skilled, a phenomenon known worldwide as “brain drain”.²⁶ Data from the OECD’s “Education at a Glance 2024” report²⁷ provide crucial comparative context. Although the report does not isolate emigrants’ qualifications, it compares the qualifications of Portugal’s resident population with the OECD average (the main destinations for skilled Portuguese emigration).

  • Population living in Portugal (aged 25–64): Only 30% have higher education. A large share (41%) have not completed secondary education.

  • OECD average (aged 25–64): 41% have higher education, and only 19% lack secondary education.

This gap suggests that skilled Portuguese (30% prevalence) are emigrating to economies where their qualifications are the norm (41% prevalence), seeking pay and career opportunities matching their training that the national labour market (where 41% of the workforce has low qualifications) cannot offer.

3.2. Filling the Demographic Gap: The Profile of Immigration

Portugal’s national population is ageing rapidly. The GEP report on labour shortages¹² identifies ageing as a primary cause of the quantitative shortage.

Pordata’s 2021 data²⁸ illustrate this demographic crisis clearly:

  • Ageing index (Portuguese): 189 older people (65+) for every 100 young people (under 15).

The immigrant population entering Portugal has a vital demographic profile that acts as a direct counterweight to this trend.

  • Ageing index (foreigners): Only 101 older people for every 100 young people.²⁸

  • Working-age population: Data from the Migration and Asylum Report and AIMA²⁹ show that 80.5% to 85% of foreign residents are of potentially working age (15–64). The largest age group is 25–44.

Immigration, then, is not only filling job vacancies; it is filling a demographic gap, injecting youth into a rapidly ageing workforce.

This analysis confirms Narrative 2. Portugal is part of an “asymmetric exchange”. It is exporting its young (30% of the cohort)²⁵ and, in particular, its “brains”²⁶ to higher-skilled OECD economies.²⁷ At the same time, the nationals who stay, older and more qualified, avoid the low-skilled, high-intensity jobs described in Section 2.

This creates a double vacuum: a demographic one (not enough young people to sustain the system) and a labour one in essential sectors (agriculture, construction, food services). Immigration, which is structurally young²⁹ and concentrated in exactly these sectors¹⁶, fills both at once.

The emigration of skilled nationals does not “make room” one-for-one for immigrants. It creates a structural crisis (demographic and labour) that immigration is the main market solution for easing, allowing the economy and the welfare state to keep functioning.

Table 3: The Demographic Paradox: Comparative Profiles (Nationals vs. Immigrants)

Demographic/Labour Indicator National / Resident Population Emigrant Population Immigrant Population
Ageing index (2021) 189 (older per 100 young) N/A (mostly young) 101 (older per 100 young)
% working-age population (15–64) (Declining) N/A (mostly working age) 80.5%–85.0%
% of young people (born in PT) abroad N/A 30% N/A
% with higher education (pop. 25–64) 30% → Destinations at 41% (OECD average) N/A (varied profile, but concentrated in low-skilled sectors)
Employment concentration General distribution (with reluctance in key sectors) → Skilled jobs in the OECD Massive concentration in agriculture (41%), food services (31%), construction (23%)

Sources: Pordata ²⁸; AIMA ²⁹; OECD ²⁷; Emigration Observatory ²⁵

Section 4: Counterfactual Scenario: The Economic and Fiscal Impact of “Zero Immigration”

The final section of this report runs a simulated scenario: modelling the economic and fiscal consequences of an abrupt halt to immigration in Portugal (“zero immigration”), focusing on the critical sectors identified. This analysis quantifies the structural dependence that the previous sections established qualitatively.

4.1. The Pillar of the Real Economy: GDP Dependence

The sectors identified in Section 2 (agriculture, construction, hotels and restaurants) are not peripheral; they are central pillars of the Portuguese economy and its export profile.

2023 data¹⁷ quantify their weight in gross domestic product (GDP):

  • Agriculture and construction: Together they accounted for 7% of Portuguese GDP in 2023.

  • Tourism (accommodation and food services): Equal to 10% of GDP in the same year.

Combined, these sectors, highly dependent on foreign labour, account for at least 17% of Portugal’s GDP. Tourism matters even more, accounting for 20% of total exports and 45% of services exports in 2023.¹⁷

The counterfactual analysis is straightforward: under “zero immigration”, these vacancies would not be filled by national workers. As shown in Section 2, there is a structural “preference mismatch”¹² and a “lack of people interested”²⁰ in these jobs.

The result would not be a replacement of workers, but a collapse of productive capacity in sectors that make up 17% of the national economy. Without the 41% of foreign workers in agriculture, 31% in food services and 23% in construction¹⁶, the capacity to harvest, build infrastructure and meet tourist demand (which generates 20% of exports) would be severely compromised. The article citing these data is conclusive: “Without immigrants, Portugal would not have the productive capacity it has achieved”.¹⁷

4.2. The Pillar of Fiscal Sustainability: Social Security

Beyond the real economy (GDP), the most dramatic impact of a “zero immigration” scenario would be on the sustainability of the Portuguese welfare state, specifically the pension system (Social Security).

As detailed in Section 3, the Portuguese population is ageing rapidly (index of 189)²⁸, placing the Social Security system under enormous pressure (more pension beneficiaries, fewer active contributors). The immigrant population, structurally younger (index of 101)²⁸ and with a high activity rate²⁹, is a vital net contributor to this system.

The data on the net balance (immigrants’ contributions minus the social benefits they receive) are clear and show a growing contribution³⁰:

  • Net balance (2021): A positive balance of +€968 million (€1,293 million in contributions against only €325 million in social benefits).²⁸

  • Net balance (2022): The positive balance grew to +€1,604.2 million.³¹

  • Net balance (2023/2024): The positive balance grew again, reaching +€1,820 million (almost €2,200 million in contributions against about €380 million in social benefits).³²

This net contribution of €1.82 billion a year, generated by a population that made up only 7.6% of the total in 2022⁶, is a fundamental pillar of Portugal’s fiscal sustainability.³³

4.3. The “Zero Immigration” Scenario: Fiscal Collapse

A fiscal impact study cited by Eurodicas modelled precisely this counterfactual scenario.³⁴ It asked what would happen if Portugal stopped receiving immigrants and, consequently, lost their tax and Social Security contributions.

The conclusions are severe:

  • Higher tax burden: To keep the current level of public services (health, pensions, education) without running a deficit, Portugal’s total tax burden would have to rise from about 35% of GDP to 43% of GDP.³⁴

  • Cost per citizen: This 8-percentage-point rise in taxes as a share of GDP is not abstract. The study calculated that every national citizen would have to pay, on average, €1,700 a year more in taxes and contributions to make up for the absence of foreign workers.³⁴

This scenario shows that immigration, besides being essential to the real economy, works as a demographic and fiscal subsidy that lets national citizens enjoy a lower tax burden than would be needed to sustain their own welfare system, given their ageing demographic profile.

Table 4: Impact of the “Zero Immigration” Scenario (c. 2023–2024)

Impact Metric Value (with Current Immigration) Projection (“Zero Immigration” Scenario)
Immigrants’ net balance with Social Security +€1.82 billion (per year) €0 (immediate loss of this net revenue)
Total tax burden (% of GDP) ≈ 35% of GDP ≈ 43% of GDP
Additional tax cost per national citizen €0 (baseline) +€1,700 (per year)
Productive capacity (key sectors) 100% (operational) Collapse of capacity in 17% of GDP (agriculture, construction, tourism)

Sources: Eurodicas ³⁴; Migration Observatory ³¹; Pordata ²⁸; Bank of Portugal ¹⁷

Section 5: Conclusion: Immigration as Complementarity and Sustainability

A thorough analysis of official data and institutional reports for 2021–2025 answers the four hypotheses in full, replacing myth with empirical reality.

5.1. Review of the Hypotheses

1. Replacement Myth (“Taking the Jobs”): REJECTED.

The data do not support this narrative. On the contrary, they refute it categorically. The immigrant population, especially from outside the EU, faces unemployment rates (14.3%) more than double the national average (6.1%)⁷, as well as higher precarity (33% vs 16%)⁷ and poverty risk. This points to vulnerability and shock absorption, not the displacement of nationals.

2. Narrative 1 (Sector Complementarity): CONFIRMED.

The analysis confirms a direct match between market needs and the profile of immigrant labour. GEP¹² and IEFP¹³ reports confirm a structural shortage of national labour in low-paid, high-intensity sectors (construction, food services, agriculture) due to “preference mismatches”. Employment data¹⁶ show that immigrants are massively concentrated in exactly these sectors (41% in agriculture, 31% in food services), proving that they fill vacancies nationals do not take.

3. Narrative 2 (Brain Drain and Demographic Vacuum): CONFIRMED.

Portugal is going through an asymmetric demographic exchange. The country “exports” a significant share of its youth (30% of those born in Portugal live abroad)²⁵ and of its skilled workforce (“brain drain”).²⁶ This creates a double vacuum: (1) a demographic one, with the national population ageing fast (index of 189)²⁸, and (2) a labour one in the essential sectors left empty. Immigration, structurally younger (index of 101)²⁸ and concentrated in these sectors¹⁶, fills both at once.

4. Counterfactual Scenario (“Zero Immigration”): SEVERE IMPACT CONFIRMED.

The scenario exercise shows that immigration is a pillar of Portugal’s macroeconomic stability. Its absence would mean (1) a collapse of productive capacity in sectors that make up 17% of GDP¹⁷ and (2) a fiscal collapse. Losing the +€1.82 billion a year net balance for Social Security³² would require raising the tax burden from 35% to 43% of GDP, costing every national citizen an extra €1,700 a year.³⁴

5.2. Final Conclusion

Analysis of official data from 2021 to 2025 shows that immigration is not a threat to Portuguese nationals’ jobs. On the contrary, it works as a mechanism of structural complementarity and fiscal sustainability.

The Portuguese economy, facing the twin challenges of an ageing population²⁸ and the continuous emigration of its skilled human capital²⁵, has become structurally dependent on immigrant labour. This labour fills the essential vacancies that the national workforce, older and with more choice, no longer fills.

At the same time, immigrants’ young age profile²⁹ makes them massive net contributors to the welfare state³², funding the pension system on which the ageing national population depends. Immigration, then, is not the cause of the Portuguese labour market’s problems; according to the data, it is a vital solution for its economic and fiscal sustainability.

References

Sources are listed under their original titles, most of them in Portuguese.

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  25. OEm nos média - Observatório da Emigração (consultado em 2 de novembro de 2025), https://observatorioemigracao.pt/np4/1351/

  26. Portugal perde nove mil milhões de euros com a fuga de cérebros - Detalhe de Artigo (consultado em 2 de novembro de 2025), https://www.compete2020.gov.pt/detalhe/detalhe/noticia_DE

  27. Equidade na Educação (consultado em 2 de novembro de 2025), https://www.dgeec.medu.pt/api/ficheiros/66e7f3de081cd43c247ab6f9

  28. População portuguesa e imigração - Instituto +Liberdade (consultado em 2 de novembro de 2025), https://maisliberdade.pt/maisfactos/populacao-portuguesa-e-imigracao/

  29. Relatório de Migrações e Asilo 2023 - AIMA (consultado em 2 de novembro de 2025), https://aima.gov.pt/documents/rma-2023.pdf

  30. Contribuições de imigrantes para Segurança Social portuguesa aumentam para recorde de 1200 milhões de euros - Observador (consultado em 2 de novembro de 2025), https://observador.pt/2022/12/21/contribuicoes-de-imigrantes-para-seguranca-social-portuguesa-aumentam-para-recorde-de-1200-milhoes-de-euros/

  31. O Impacto Positivo dos Imigrantes na Segurança Social de Portugal … (consultado em 2 de novembro de 2025), https://apmredemut.pt/2024/01/03/o-impacto-positivo-dos-imigrantes-na-seguranca-social-de-portugal/

  32. Crescimento da Segurança Social em 2024 foi graças aos trabalhadores imigrantes (consultado em 2 de novembro de 2025), https://www.esquerda.net/artigo/crescimento-da-seguranca-social-em-2024-foi-gracas-aos-trabalhadores-imigrantes/95783

  33. Imigrantes impulsionam crescimento da Segurança Social em Portugal - Euro Dicas (consultado em 2 de novembro de 2025), https://www.eurodicas.com.br/contribuicao-de-imigrantes-para-seguranca-social/

  34. Est

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